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THE PHYSICIAN AS AN EXPERT WITNESS -
SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
John J. Broderick*
Introduction
By way of introduction it may be well to state the modus operandi. First,
an examination of the deficiencies and defects in the use of medical expert
testimony generally, and the psychological reasons underlying these inade-
quacies, will be made. This will be followed by an examination of the steps
taken to ameliorate these defects as elaborated in a report by a special com-
mittee of the bar of New York City entitled Impartial Medical Testimony,
dealing with the use of independent and impartial medical experts to secure
a better and more expeditious disposition of personal injury cases. Finally, the
conclusions to be drawn from the report will be discussed as well as the
possibility and feasibility of adopting the plan on a national basis.
I. THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN IMPROVING MEDICAL TESTIMONY
Dr. J. W. Courtney, addressing the Harvard Medical School graduating
class of 1915, stated:
The present mode of procedure in our courts, in so far as medical
testimony is concerned, is not a particularly edifying one. To illustrate
this point, let us take, for example, a case of the type which is most
commonly met with in everyday work of the courts - an action of tort
for personal injuries. In such a case, the plaintiff is practically always of
the proletariat class; the defendant, a public service corporation, or an
insurance company. The army of witnesses on either side is generally
appalling. Of these the medical ones alone concern us. They are of two
hostile camps, and prepared to attempt, under solemn oath, to uphold
opinions diametrically opposed, yet supposedly derived from a single
series of facts and observations.
The situation is a deplorable one, and nobody discerns the glaring
wrong of it all with clearer vision than certain high-minded men from
our ranks, who have long striven to procure legislative enactment look-
ing toward the abolition of this evil.
To me, for many reasons, which I cannot here enumerate, it seems
hopeless to expect that legislative appeal on the part of such men will
ever be fruitful of the desired results. Hence, it is the bounden duty of
every man in the profession so to shape his conduct toward cases which
promise to eventuate into court proceedings, that due respect will be
given his opinion, that he will not merit the biting sarcasm, the sneers,
* Assistant Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. LL.B. St. John's
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the raillery and general brow-beating of opposing counsel. And most
of all, that through his efforts the ends of justice will really be accomp-
lished.1
That there is some validity to Dr. Courtney's criticism, is evidenced by
the fact that in 1934 a distinguished New York attorney spoke of having
defended a physician "in the face of the leers and jeers of opposing counsel."2
Today, many physicians seem reluctant to examine or treat cases of injury or
disease, which are likely later to become the basis of a controvertible claim or
a matter of litigation in the courts or before an administrative body. The
successful physician who stands high in his profession and whose opinion and
impartiality is often of great value particularly shuns this important responsi-
bility.
Why do many physicians attempt to avoid the trial process? If the
physician knows he may be called as a witness in a court or compensation
proceeding, he immediately envisions the situations that are likely to con-
front him. He sees himself forced to cancel a full schedule of office -and
hospital appointments because of a call to appear in court or at a hearing. He
hurries down to court and then spends hours standing around waiting to be
put on the stand. He enters upon the ordeal of giving testimony before a
group of laymen who lack the background necessary to understand his scien-
tific explanations. He is the innocent pawn between contesting forces. One
side, attempting to elicit his most favorable opinion, expects him to stretch his
ethical and personal judgment to the breaking point in order to establish all
of its medical allegations, whether warranted or not. The other side, on cross-
examination, in an attempt to refute the statements he has just made, questions
his professional qualifications, his motive for appearing as a witness, his find-
ings and his opinions. 3
Another reason for the physician's reluctance is that some patients, with-
out the slightest qualm of moral conscience, expect their family physician to
prolong unduly the period of treatment and disability as well as to exaggerate
the prognosis and extent of permanent disability. Naturally, when confronted
with this situation, most physicians resent the position in which they are placed
by their patient and immediately reject the implied or open suggestion and
report the medical facts in accordance with their actual and scientific belief.
However, many physicians may allow their better judgment to be swayed by
a misguided sense of loyalty to the patient or his family, in assisting him to
establish or exaggerate an unjustified claim against the defendant. Again,
Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher, referring to psychiatrists, points out that while
lawyers are accustomed to the trial process, they fail to realize how alien and
even repulsive the ordinary trial is to the average physician:
The physician is accustomed to being listened to deferentially when his
opinion is sought by a colleague or a patient. He is by nature an inde-
1 Elliot and Spillman, Medical Testimony in Personal Injury Cases, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
466-67 (1935). For a comprehensive discussion see 2 WIMORE, EVMENCE § 563 (3d ed. 1940);
Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401-524 (1935); LADD, CASES ON EVmENCE 648-55
(2d ed. 1955).
2 Elliot and Spillman, supra note 1, at 474.
3 Lindenbaum, The Enigmas of Medical Evidence, 52 CAsE & COM. 20, 21 (May-June 1947).
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pendent individual. Under our American system, he is his own boss;
he takes orders from no man. He is accustomed to making his investiga-
tions and pursuing the truth by his own methods. In the courtroom
everything is changed. He is not permitted to ask pertinent questions
or to express an opinion freely and in his own way so as to assure
accuracy, even though he has sworn to "tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth." He is told when to speak and when to stop
speaking. He may be asked to express an opinion on a hypothetical
statement of facts which he is convinced gives a wholly distorted picture
of the actual case at issue, and he will not be allowed to object that
he does not consider the stated facts to be true. Instead of having his
views received with the deference and respect to which he is accus-
tomed, he is likely to be disconcerted - if this be his first experience
- on cross-examination to hear his professional competence and even
his intelligence impugned and his pronouncements ridiculed, misstated,
and twisted into absurdities (or perhaps exposed as being absurdities
by a lawyer displaying a surprising familiarity with the scientific learn-
ing and literature on the subject). Is there any wonder that the medical
expert often dislikes and even resents the role he is forced to play?4
To determine the attitude of psychiatrists on this problem, Dr. Gutt-
macher in 1953 as Chairman of the Legal Aspects Committee of the American
Psychiatric Association, sent out a questionnaire. The replies revealed that
about twenty per cent of the psychiatrists were unwilling to go into court in a
criminal case, and another fifteen per cent were only willing to serve as an
expert in a criminal case when they were employed by the court. Eighty per
cent of the psychiatrists found that the commonly accepted legal tests were
unsatisfactory. Less than half of these felt that they could accurately present
their findings and opinions under the present method of court procedure. The
greatest number based this on the partisan role that they had to play in the
trial process. The next largest number felt that the restrictions inherent in the
inquisitorial method, as contrasted to the expository method, were the greatest
handicap; that they were required to reply to the questions which were given
them by answering yes, or no, rather than being permitted to express freely
their knowledge and opinions, even though they had sworn to tell the whole
truth.'
Dr. Guttmacher drew upon his own experience by relating the story of
the first case in which he was privately employed to serve as a witness before a
state industrial accident commission. The complainant was unloading a beer
truck and had inexpertly allowed a full barrell to roll down upon his head,
with disastrous results. Dr. Guttmacher was sitting at the hearing, biding his
time, as he often did in court proceedings, when he became engaged in con-
versation with another physician. He learned that they were to testify in the
same case, but on opposite sides. They talked it over, and Dr. Guttmacher said
to him, "you know, we are in such agreement, that we ought to toss up a
4 GUTTMACHER AND NVEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 206-07 (1952).
r Guttmacher, Viewpoint of the Psychiatrist, 13 MD. L. REV. 307 (1953). See Gurrmcaax
AND WEmOFEN, supra note 4, at 248-68; Goldsmith, The Medical Witness Gets a Break, 60 CAsE
& CoM. 14 (July-Aug. 1955); Averbach, Aids for the Improvement of the Doctor-Lawyer Re-
lationship, 1956 INs. L. J. 237.
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quarter and see which one has to testify." To this his opponent replied: "I am
afraid you are young and naive; by the time your lawyer gets you to stretch
the truth as far as it can be stretched, and my lawyer gets through stretching
the truth as far as he can, nobody will feel that we were in agreement about
anything."6
While this statement may define the attitudes of some physicians, one
lawyer, on the other hand, questions the motives of some doctors and feels
that the partisan, as distinct from the impartial medical witness does not aid
the lawyer's search for truth, because the doctor, like the party litigants, is
thinking in terms of the verdict and not a dispassionate evaluation of medical
facts. The medical witness is, essentially, a paid partisan witness, the extent
of his partisanship depending upon the elasticity of his conscience. The rea-
son for his employment is his value as a witness, not his skill as a physician.
In this attorney's opinion, this leads to incompatible and contradictory
testimony:
The difference of opinion between expert witnesses cannot be ex-
plained in terms of objective medical findings. It is a mistake to
approach the problem in such terms. It must be remembered that
expert witnesses are employed to testify, not to treat. If a case is
largely dependent upon subjective findings, the plaintiff's expert accepts
all such findings and utilizes them for the maximum benefit of the
plaintiff. The defendant's expert rejects all such findings, and since there
is [sic] no objective findings, finds no disability. The difference between
the enthusiastic belief in the subjective findings, and the equally en-
thusiastic disbelief in the findings, represents the difference in the
opinions. But even such so-called objective evidence, such as X-rays,
can be interpreted to serve diametrically opposite points of view. There
always seems to be some evidence, or some piece of evidence, which
can be exploited, or interpreted to prove the case of each expert, no
matter how irreconcilable their ultimate conclusions may be.
The plaintiffs expert evaluates his findings in favor of the plaintiff;
the defendant's expert evaluates his findings in favor of the defendant.
The case thus becomes a trial by partisan witnesses. Somewhere in
between such partisan evidence lies the truth. The jury has no means of
ascertaining this truth. The jury, at best, can believe the plaintiff's
experts, or the defendant's experts, or none of the experts, and guess
at the injury suffered by the plaintiff.7
In rebuttal to the argument that doctors themselves are responsible for
the extreme views taken by opposing parties, Dr. Shabat, as a physician,
finds it difficult to understand why lawyers make bitter and scathing state-
ments about doctors who disagree with other doctors in a given medical
problem in a lawsuit. "No one," he says, "can argue about a fracture line
that is visible even to the lay jury, but not infrequently, certain lines on X-rays
may be interpreted differently by plaintiff and defense witnesses." Neverthe-
less, he does admit that:
It is my own conviction that a doctor, particularly an excellent, well-
qualified one who continuously examines and issues reports for the
6 Guttmacher, Viewpoint of the Psychiatrist, 13 MD. L. REv. 307-08. (1953).
7 Anderson, Unbiased Medical Testimony-An Actuality, AimuicA MEnicAL AssocsATioN,
MEnDICOLEAL SYMPosIUMs 102, 104-05 (Oct. 9, 1955).
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plaintiff's side becomes obtuse, and the same is true for the doctor who
constantly remains on the defense side. It is my belief that any doctor,
no matter what his wonderful qualifications are, will lose his original
fine diognostic acumen and begin to follow a persistently peculiar path,
developing a tubular vision, never being able to note the periphy or
the lateral aspects of a medical problem. He can see only one thing,
he must find, when he is on the plaintiff's side, a definite causal relation-
ship between the injury and the patient's complaint even with a paucity
of objective evidence. He must create a diagnosis at all costs. On the
other hand, the same fixed idea sequence is followed by the defense
doctor who sees most cases as frauds, fakers, malingerers or psychotics.
When the case occurs, wherein actual fracture has been sustained, he
cannot bring himself to the realization or the resignation that residual
partial loss of function can and has actually occurred. As far as he is
concerned, all cases recover completely and without any residual loss.
I feel that primarily for the defense, a complete and thorough examin-
ation of the plaintiff, when attainable, should be made and reported
fully and impartially. I believe that the defense cannot be adequately
prepared when it's examining doctor deletes positive findings from his
report. This doctor usually makes a poor witness for the defense in
court when the plaintiff's lawyer directs a proper cross-examination.8
Any doctor by reason of his education and training is presumed com-
petent to advise the trier of fact. He need not be a specialist in any particular
branch of his profession nor have any experience of his own on the particular
question involved in the case.9 This leads to the difficulty encountered by Dr.
T. Conrad Wolff, a member of the Occupational Disease Board of the State
of Maryland which is made up entirely of doctors. Commenting upon the
calibre of experts appearing before the Board to contest workman's com-
pensation claims, he pointed out that:
These doctors [members of the Board] cross question the "Expert
Witness" and learn almost at once that his knowledge is fundamentally
lacking. He reasons falsely from ignorance of basic science. His con-
clusions are untenable. However, he is glib and has picked up enough
pseudo-professional jargon so that in the hands of a sharp lawyer he
could probably impress a jury. However, he is heard by Physicians,
not by jurymen and the value of his testimony is zero.
Why has the Attorney brought such a man to the witness stand
as his Expert Witness? Why has such a Doctor connived at being
rated as an Expert Witness in a matter in which his knowledge was so
palpably deficient?10
However, Dr. Wolff then cited a case where a doctor with little or no
knowledge of lead poisoning testified that the texts he had read on the subject
favored the hypothesis that lead poisoning produced arteriosclerosis. An
eminent specialist testified to the contrary, basing his opinion on the recent
findings of a research organization of high repute. Although the Board agreed
8 Shabat, Medical Expert Testimony, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCATION supra note 7, at 137.
9 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 13 (1954); TRACY, THE DOCTOR AS A WrrNss 36 (1957); Welhofen,
An Alternative to the Battle of the Experts: Hospital Examination of Criminal Defendants Before
Trial, 2 Lkw & CONTEMP. PROO. 419, 420 (1935); Gutr AcHE AND WEMoFaN, op cit. supra note
4, at 210-15. See SCHOaEDER, MEDICiNE AND THE LAw: A NEW FRoNTMR OPENS 246 (1957), where
the author states that this problem of misunderstanding between physicians and attorneys does not
exist in Latin American countries.
10 Wolff, Viewpoint of Industrial Medicine, 13 MD. L. REv. 293, 294 (1953).
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with the eminent expert, the court, on appeal, upheld the outdated opinions
of the text books, scientific research of the highest type to the contrary not-
withstanding.:"
Another doctor was of the same point of view concerning the competency
of experts. In his opinion, one of the outstanding weaknesses of expert testi-
mony was the carelessness of the courts in admitting the testimony of so-called
"experts" who were as a matter of fact unqualified. He felt that most trial
judges in exercising their discretion as to the qualifications of the expert looked
upon the possession of the degree of Doctor of Medicine, and a license to
practice, as sufficient to qualify a physician as an expert in aily field. He
pointed out that as far back as 1878, the Supreme Court of Michigan said
apropros of this matter: "Unfortunately for the administration of justice
persons are sometimes found who with small experience and large conceit
have succeeded in formulating theories under which, if properly applied,
there would be hardly enough sane persons found to sit upon juries or attend
to business."' 2
There are two other difficulties, which deter the doctor from appearing
in court as an expert witness. One is the fear of cross-examination. The
opposing counsel may deliberately attempt to confuse the witness or attempt
to show the jury that he is really not an expert after all. This point is vividly
illustrated by Dr. Overholser, when he states:
The story is related that during the Thaw trial in New York thirty years
ago an eminent psychiatrist who had given a lengthy and cogent bit of
testimony, was asked on cross-examination, "Doctor, are you familiar
with the Argyll-Robertson pupil?" He answered in the affirmative,
whereupon he was asked, "Was Argyll Robertson one man or two?"
Upon replying that he did not know, the cross-examiner said, "That is
all, Doctor, thank you." The impression was thus left in the minds of
the jury that if he did not know the answer to an elementary question
of this sort it was highly improbable that his opinion on complicated
questions of mentality would be worth anything, not considering the
fact that it made no difference whatever whether Argyll Robertson was
one man or two!' s
The second is the hypothetical question.' 4 It is used when the expert has
no first-hand knowledge of the situation at issue and has made no investigation
of the facts for himself, the most convenient way of securing the benefit of
his scientific skill is to ask him to assume certain facts and then to give his
opinions or inferences in view of such assumptions. The hypothetical question
has been vigorously criticized. Wigmore says, "It is a strange irony that the
hypothetical question, which is one of the few truly scientific features of the
rules of Evidence, should have become that feature which does most to dis-
gust men of science with the law of Evidence."'15 One physician states that the
11 Id. at 294-96.
12 Overholser, The Psychiatrist in Court, 7 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 31, 43 (1938). See GUTTMACHER
AND WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 230-47.
13 Overholser, supra note 12, at 41-42.
14 Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
402, 414 (1935); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 14 (1954); GUTrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note
4, at 205-29, 230-47; TRAcY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 41-45.
15 2 WIrMOR, EvDEN E § 686 (3d ed. 1940).
THE PHYSICIAN AS AN EXPERT WINESS
practice of misusing the hypothetical question as a restatement of the case
to re-impress the jury is bad strategy because "it is so unfair and confusing
and degrading that it does not clarify the issue nor help achieve justice.' 16
His criticism seems well-founded when it is realized that in a California case,
the court referred to a question "contained in some 83 pages of typewritten
transcript, and an objection involved in 14 pages more of the record.. .. -17
The same doctor recommended that the hypothetical questions be discussed
and settled in the same manner as instructions, either at the pre-trial hearing
or during the trial, with the jury excluded.' 8 In his opinion, "either the judge
should see to it that the hypothetical question contains only the truth from
the witnesses and from the evidence, or the expert witness must see to it that
from the hypothetical question he considers only what appears to him to be
true."' 9 He referred to a case in which he served as an expert:
[F]ive witnesses stated that the testator weighted 160 to 180 pounds,
and one witness testified that the testator weighed 100 pounds (before
he died), one attending physician stated that his blood pressure was
200 (m.m. mercury systolic) and the hospital record was that his blood
pressure was 100. On cross-examination, counsel asked: "Assume fur-
ther, Doctor, that the hypothetical man weighed 160 to 180 pounds
and assume he weighed 100 pounds, and assume his blood pressure
was 200, and assume it was 100 ... have you an opinion ... etc. ?"
The question was intended to be absurd and to make the expert and his
answer silly. I interrupted and asked the judge what I was to assume.
He replied, "You must assume it all, all as equally true, and delete
nothing of the hypothetical question from your mind." I asked him if
he could do that, and he replied, "No, but you must." How much better
if the judge had ironed out the phraseology of the hypothetical question
and had seen to it that it was a fair presentation. 20
At the present time when a witness's competency is assailed on the
grounds of lack of intelligence a poorly contrived ad hoc examination pro-
cedure conducted by the judge and the attorneys is utilized to determine the
issue. It has been recommended that in this situation the examination of the
witness be conducted not only by an impartial expert but, similar to the
recommended procedure for hypothetical questions, outside of the court
room.
21
Based on his experience in the courts, Dr. Guttmacher feels that the way
to bring the greatest possible degree of medical help to the courts is not by
partisan testimony. He favors the procedure set out in the Model Code of-
Evidence of the American Law Institute wherein the parties agree on the
experts who serve. If they cannot reach an agreement then the matter is
taken before the court and the court picks the experts. These experts all have
the right to examine the defendant personally. The experts meet together
16 Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in Probate Proceedings, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 448, 455
(1935). See Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 414-18.
17 Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 228 Pac. 25, 35 (1924).
18 Hulbert, supra note 16, at 454.
19 Id. at 455. See GUTrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 224-26.
20 Hulbert, supra note 16, at 455-56 See GuTTmACHER & WIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 225.
21 Redmont, The Psychological Bases of Evidence Practices: Intelligence, 42 MINN. L. REv.
559, 591-92 (1958).
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and frame a joint report, if possible. If not, there is a majority report and a
minority report. The report is then filed with the court, and it is available to
both parties. However, this does not deprive either side of the right to intro-
duce its own experts, if they wish to controvert the evidence of this neutral
group. In his opinion, juries are confused by medical testimony and would
rather take the view of the neutral expert than the partisan expert because
they feel, as he put it, that the neutral experts have "no axe to grind." He
also favors the abolition of the hypothetical question.22
In 1937, the trial judge's common law power to call experts was im-
plemented in the Model Expert Testimony Act which was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws23 as a uniform act
and was redesignated a Model Act in 1943. It was adopted in South Dakota
in 1942, 2 and was later embodied in the Uniform Rules of Evidence formu-
lated by the Conference on Uniform State Laws in 1953.25 The Commis-
sioners stated the reasons for the provisions as follows:
Parties consistently employ experts upon the strength of their bias,
which may range from a professional prejudice to naked perjury ....
There can be no doubt of the need for expert testimony. The
problem is how to eliminate the evils of bias and partisanship which
shape it. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has proposed an act which is aimed to remedy these evils.26
The act provides that the court upon request or upon its own motion
may appoint an expert or experts to testify at the trial. If the parties can
agree on an expert the court shall appoint him. His compensation in a civil
action would be paid in equal portions by both parties and charged as costs
in the case. However, the parties may call additional experts of their own
selection but the expense of the private experts is not taxable as costs. The
act dispenses with the requirement of the use of the hypothetical question. 27
It has been pointed out that "the reasons for the Act are valid today
but the Act itself seems antiquated. It belongs to the age before the new
Rules, with their flexibility, discovery procedures, pre-trial conferences, and
other procedures designed to remove it Court trial from a sporting event to
an accurate appraisal of the facts involved in the controversy."28 The Model
Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute also provides generally for
the utilization of the non-partisan expert.
However, in the above proposals for improving medical testimony, a
weakness in the form of implementation is revealed because no provision is
made for the selection and appointment of panels of experts. In 1953, Dr.
Wolff, referred to earlier, posed a series of questions which in the light of
subsequent developments have proved prophetic:
22 GUTrMAcHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 224-29.
23 9A U.L.A. 351-63 (1957).
24 S.D. CODE § 36.01 (Supp. 1952).
25 RULEs 59, 60. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws 194-96 (1953).
26 9A U.L.A. 352 (1957).
27 Id. at 353-63.
28 Anderson, supra note 7, at 117.
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1. Is it possible in a difficult and complicated medical litigation,
that the presiding officer of the Court, Commission or Board of Inquiry
,should have the power to draw from the panel issued by the Medical
Society the names of whatever Expert Witnesses may seem to him to be
necessary? Or, alternatively, could the Medical Society make these
nominations at his request?
2. Would it be possible that these Expert Witnesses be furnished
with Case Histories, Laboratory Reports and stenographic transcripts of
the legal procedures that have already taken place?
3. Would it be possible to accord these Expert Witnesses reason-
ably adequate time in which to review the medical evidence before
them and reach reasonable conclusions?
4. Would it be possible to arrange for the protection of these
witnesses against the importunities of Counsel or other interested per-
sons while reviewing the evidence, though subject to Cross Questioning
in Court after they had reached their conclusions?
5. Would it be possible to arrange that the emoluments of these
Expert Witnesses be added to the Court Costs and defrayed ultimately
according to the direction of the presiding officer of the Court?
6. Would not such a system as this do away with the undesirable
situation where each side to the dispute has its own "Expert Witness"?
I would like very much to see these matters discussed, because, as
I view it, constructive changes in. some present techniques may very
well be indicated. 29
A final, but most important factor is the delay in obtaining trial,
particularly in cases arising out of automobile accidents. As early as 1932,
Judge Crane was aware of this situation and in a speech before the Bar
Association of the City of New York stated:
We find our calenders frightfully congested. In this county the trial of
cases is at least two years behind, and in Kings County, Brooklyn, the
calendars are four years behind, in Queens and Nassau counties, three.
In the City Court of Brooklyn, which is about six years old, I am in-
formed that it is over five years behind. The lawyers tell me that their
clients are obliged to settle their cases at nominal figures because they
are unable to wait for litigation. Financial reasons demand a sacrifice
of their rights. As likely as not, after a verdict, a case is carried up on
appeal and reversed either by the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals, and the same procedure starts all over again .... The number
of automobile accident cases has added materially to the number of
cases upon our calendar .... What a speedy disposition there would
then be of all these automobile accident cases when the court could
appoint arbiters without limit - a lawyer, a doctor, a layman - who
would dispose of the case as satisfactorily, yes more satisfactorily than
most of the courts and juries.80
On the question of relieving congested court calendars in automobile
cases, some have suggested comprehensive public compensation plans anal-
agous to workman's compensation programs.8 1 Alternative proposals suggest
the creation of special automobile courts in which a three-man tribunal com-
posed of a jurist, a layman, and a physician would administer the law under
the principles of comparative negligence, the traditional rationale of con-
29 Wolff, supra note 10, at 297.
30' Elliot & Spiman, supra note 1, at 468.
81 GREEN, TRAFIc Vicrms, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958).
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tributory negligence playing no part in the determination and award of
damages.32 In any event, the development of impartial medical testimony
seems to be the first practical step that can be taken within the framework of
the existing court system to achieve the expeditious determination of auto-
mobile accident cases.
II. THE NEW YORK EXPERIMENT: A SOLUTION
A study of the successful development of the New York project serves
as an answer to the critics of impartial medical testimony and as the basis
for executing similar plans for those already committed to the idea. In New
York, the original impetus for such a plan came from the Justices of the
Supreme Court of New York County who daily viewed the incompetence and
bias spawned by independent experts, and saw in this system one of the basic
causes for the congested court dockets. In their view, the long delays in bring-
ing the personal injury suits to trial were a result of unnecessarily lengthy
trials in which the battle of the experts was the central factor contributing to
the delay. It had also been pointed out that the normal chances for settlement
which could be depended upon to relieve congestion were diminished by
each party's confidence in the views of his own expert. 33
To remedy this situation the justices organized a conference of the
medical societies and bar associations for the purpose of securing a source
of reliable medical opinion in personal injury cases. As a result of this con-
ference, the Medical Expert Testimony Project evolved.
The directors of the project, Professor Delmar Karlen of the Institute of
Judicial Administration of the New York University Law Center and Dr.
Irving S. Wright, professor of Clinical Medicine at the Cornell Medical
College state that it was designed to test a remedy for the deficiencies and
abuses prevailing in the presentation of proof in judicial proceedings. 34 The
importance of the project is evidenced by the fact that 80 per cent of the cases
in the trial courts are personal injury cases. The basic idea was to set up
panels of neutral, outstanding physicians in various branches of specialized
medicine who would be available at the call of the court to make medical
examinations of plaintiffs in personal injury cases, report their findings, and
if necessary testify in those cases in which the medical aspects were contro-
versial and substantial. Their fees were to be paid not by the litigants, but by
the project.3" Thus the deficiency in the Model Expert Testimony Act was
ameliorated by arming the judges with facilities as well as power to appoint
competent experts.
The justices listed the areas of medicine in which expert testimony was
most often needed and the estimated number of doctors required in each area.
A joint committee of the New York Academy of Medicine and the New York
County Medical Society was appointed to select panel members of the highest
32 Hofstader, Alternative Proposals to the Compensation Plan, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 59, 63 (1956).
33 TRACY, THE DOCTOR AS A WrrNEss 212-13 (1957).
34 SPECIAL COMMITrEE OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY 7-8
(1956).
35 The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Ford Foundation each gave $20,000 to the project.
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qualifications and standing solely on a professional basis. The panelists, chosen
from the faculties of the leading medical colleges and the staffs of well-known
hospitals, were acknowledged as the outstanding experts in their specialties.
Further, none of them had been prominently identified with either the plain-
tiff's or defendant's side in personal injury litigation.
The justices entered a court rule 6 establishing Medical Report Office in
the court and assigned a deputy clerk to administer it. His duties included the
keeping of records, the maintenance of confidential medical panels and the
arrangement of examination by the impartial expert. Under this rule, when,
in a personal injury case, a justice was of the opinion that an examination of
the injured person and a report thereon by an impartial expert would be of
material aid to the just determination of the case, he could order such
examination and report through the Medical Report Office. A member of the
panel selected by the medical societies would make the examination, and if
the case could not be settled and it proceeded to trial, the independent expert
could be called as a witness by either party or the judge, without cost to
either party. A procedure was formulated which provided for referral of the
case to the expert, the conduct of the examination and the utilization of the
expert's report.
In accordance with New York practice, soon after cases are brought,
they are processed through a pre-trial conference during which the opposing
counsel and the justice determine the issues and the. possibility of settlement.
The medical reports of the doctors for both sides are examined by the justice
and if he finds that there is a sharp dispute as to the nature of the plaintiff's
injuries and that an impartial expert's view would be helpful, he makes an
order referring the case to the impartial expert. In the order, he sets forth the
nature of the medical dispute, the type of specialist needed and the date when
the conference will be continued. He does not list the name of a specialist
since this is the function of the Medical Report Office. The attorneys for both
parties go to the Medical Report Office where the deputy clerk consults a
confidential list of doctors in the required specialty and assigns the examina-
tion to the next doctor on the list. The clerk schedules the examination and
arranges for the submission of all medical reports and hospital records to the
impartial expert in advance of the examination. The examination made by the
panelist follows the general pattern of ordinary physical examination. When
it is completed, the expert sends a copy of his report and his bill in triplicate
to the Medical Report Office - one for each attorney and one for the justic6.
The pre-trial hearing is then resumed and settlement is again discussed in the
light of the report of the impartial medical expert. If no settlement is reached,
the case is set down for trial. As provided for by the court rule, either party
or the justice may call the examining physician as a witness and his fees will
be paid out of the project funds.37
36 N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dist., Special Rule (Dec. 1, 1952; as amended Dec. 1, 1954; as amended
Jan. 3, 1957), CAHILL & PARSONS, NEW YORK CIviL PRACTICE ACT 213 (Supp. 1958).
37 IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 34, at 13-19. See also TRACY, THE DOCTOR AS A
WITNE.SS 213-216 (1957), and Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony, 22 F.R.D. 21 (1958).
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III. RESULTS OF THE PROJECT
Between December 1, 1952, and December 1, 1954, 238 cases were
referred to impartial medical experts. Of these, 102 were settled before trial
and 18 more were settled during trial.38 There are no statistics available as to
the number of cases that were settled at the outset, because counsel did not
dare have his case submitted to an impartial expert. In the cases presented,
most of the judges reported that they were impressed not only by the im-
partiality of these experts but also by their competence.3 9 It is a fair assump-
tion that the project has accounted for the elimination of one-fifth of the
number of trials which formerly took place in New York and Bronx Counties,
and has saved a full year of time of several additional judges. Moreover, New
York's four-year backlog of cases has now been reduced to eighteen months.
To this extent, the project has helped to relieve calender congestion.
The following accomplishments were listed in the Committee report:
1. The project has improved the process of finding medical facts in
litigated cases.
2. It has helped to relieve court congestion.
3. It has had a wholesome prophylactic effect upon the formulation and
presentation of medical testimony in court.
4. It has proved that the modest expenditure involved effects a large
saving and economy in court operations.
5. It has pointed the way to better diagnosis in the field of traumatic
medicine.
6. It has alleviated the problem of the hypothetical question since the
impartial expert testifies on the basis of his own knowledge obtained
from a personal examination of the injured person.40
7. It has provided an excellent, but all too rare, example of successful
interprofessional cooperation. 4'
Some criticisms have been levelled at the project, particularly the status
of the impartial expert. 42 It is felt that by disclosing the fact that the impartial
expert was appointed and summoned to appear as a witness by the court and
that his compensation comes from court, the jury may give unwarranted
weight to his testimony. The project committee answered this criticism by
pointing out, first, that if the diagnosis of an injury is certain, that fact should
be made known to the jury; if it is uncertain, due to limitations of medical
knowledge, that fact is more likely to be admitted on the witness stand by a
doctor who is truly expert and truly impartial than by a partisan doctor.
Secondly, the impartial expert can be questioned as to the general state of
medical knowledge about the injury, the techniques used by the expert in
making his examination and as to the existence of techniques not used by
38 IMPARTtL MEDI CL TESTIMONY, supra note 34, at 28-30.
39 Id. at 34.
40 McCoRMICK, op cit. supra note 9, at § 14; RICHARDSON, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 389 (8th ed.
1955); Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1338 (1933); TRAcy, supra note 33, at 215.
41 IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESrIMONY, supra note 34, at 5.
42 Anderson, supra note 7, at 113-16; Note, The New York Medical Expert Project: An Ex.
periment in Securing Impartial Testimony, 63 YALE. LI. 1023 (1954).
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him, and as to prior inconsistent statements made by him. Finally, the
parties are still privileged to call their own experts.43
The New York project has prompted wide interest throughout the
country. This is evidenced by the fact that there is now in operation a National
Interprofessional Code for Physicians and Attorneys, drafted by a joint
Committee on Co-operation between the American Bar Association and the
American Medical Association. This code was formally adopted by the AMA
at its annual meeting in June, 1958, and by the House of Delegates of the
ABA at its convention in August, 1958.44
This code covers the furnishing of medical reports by physicians to
lawyers; pre-trial conferences between physicians and attorneys; notification
to doctors who are to be subpoened to testify; the lawyer-doctor relationship
in the courtroom; fees for services of physicians relative to litigation. It con-
tains further a recommendation that the code be implemented at state and
local levels where similar measures have not been adopted.
Although this code does not have the force of law, it does set forth
suggested rules of conduct for members of the two professions. As the pre-
amble to the code points out, it constitutes the "recognition that, with the
growing inter-relationship of medicine and law, it is inevitable that physicians
and attorneys will be drawn into steadily increasing association. It will serve
its purpose if it promotes the public welfare, improves the practical working
relationships of the two professions, and facilitates the administration of
justice. ' '43
In Baltimore, Maryland, under the impetus of the suggestions made by
Dr. Wolff, a plan containing the basic ideas of the New York project has
been evolved, and is now in operation. 40 However, an unsuccessful cam-
paign was inaugurated, primarily by plaintiff's attorneys in opposition to the
plan. They felt that:
(a) The plan would be used frequently and unnecessarily in small
damage suits, causing further unnecessary delays and complication in
small cases;
(b) That the court would unduly restrict the cross-examination of the
court-appointed expert; and
(c) That the evidence of the court-appointed expert would, as a practi-
cal matter, determine the case in the eyes of the jury, and that trials
by adverse proceedings would give way to some kind of medical arbi-
tration or medical legal proceeding.47
In May, 1958, the Cleveland Academy of Medicine's Joint Committee
on Expert Medical Testimony submitted a plan for an Expert Medical
43 IMPAMRTAL MEDICAL TEsTIMONY, supra note 34, at 33.
44 44 A.B.A.L 1116 (1958). A similar measure was recently adopted in the District of Columbia.
See 26 3.D.C. BAR 56 (1959).
45 See the full text set out in Hartshorne, A Contribution to Public Welfare: The National In-
terprofessional Code, 45 A.B.AJ. 31 (1959).
46 Anderson, supra note 7, at 107-16. Under the Baltimore plan the doctors are paid by the
parties either by agreement, assessment of costs, or direction of the court, while under the New
York plan they are paid from court funds. Peck, supra note 37, at 26.
47 Anderson, supra note 7, at 114.
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Testimony Project similar to the New York project.48 Although the plan re-
ceived much favorable comment in the local papers, the Cuyahoga County
Bar Association expressed disapproval. The major objection was that the
litigants would not get a fair decision because juries would tend to accept
without question the decision of a court-appointed medical expert and thus
preclude court-room debate. They also felt that the expert would be bound to
reflect the partiality of his own school of thought and thus put the litigants at
the mercy of the expert's prejudices.
In 1952, Justice Peck expressed the hope that the plan would have a
psychological and prophylactic effect in inducing medical experts for boths
sides to moderate their claims, since they might be reviewed by an outstand-
ing authority in their own field.49 That Justice Peck's hope has been realized
is evidenced by his statement in 1956 in the preface to the project report
that "The plan detailed in the following pages has now advanced beyond
the experimental stages and has been adopted as a regular part of the
operations of the Supreme Court of the State of New York in the First
Department." 0
Conclusion
A major assertion of the Anglo-American legal system is that truth will
best be achieved through the operation of the adversary system. However,
when this assumption is rigidly applied in formulating the procedural and
substantive law governing the presentation of medical evidence, the ascertain-
ment of truth seems to be progressively submerged under doubtful techniques
of conducting lawsuits and the inharmonious relations that develop between
attorneys and physicians. The inadequacy of the law's treatment of medical
testimony is revealed in the understandable reluctance of doctors toward
testifying in court trials and in their views on the dubious motives of lawyers.
The law fails to mold its methods into a form which allows the doctor the same
high professional standing within the courtroom that he enjoys in his private
practice. This deficiency stems from the law's rigid principles of adversary
justice, and reflects its failure to utilize the talents of professional men most
efficaciously by challenging them with roles of professional impartiality rather
than casting them in unfamiliar character parts of biased witnesses.
The solution to both problems - the awkwardness of the law's method
of handling medical testimony, and the hesitancy of doctors to lend their
best efforts to the legal process - will be found in a system in which the law
learns to rely on the professional competence and integrity of the physician.
The beginnings of such plans have been observed. It is hoped that through
them the modem evidentiary rules for eliciting medical testimony will en-
hance the doctor's professional stature in the courtroom while accomplishing
the primary goal of an expeditious and just determination of the personal
injury action.
48 CLEVELAND ACADEMY OF MEDICINE BULLETIN, THE PHYSICIAN AS AN EXPERT WITNESS II
(June, 1958).
49 36 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 120-21 (1952). See also Pope, The Presentation of Scientific Evidence,
31 TEXAS L. REV. 794, 807 (1953).
50 IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 34, at v. See also Peck, supra note 37.
